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TURNING AWAY FROM LAW?t 
David M. Trubek* 
THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, VOLUME I: THE AMERICAN 
EXPERIENCE; VOLUME 2: COMPARATIVE STUDIES. Edited by Rich-
ard L. Abel. New York: Academic Press. 1982. $29.50 per volume. 
JUSTICE WITHOUT LAw? By Jerold S. Auerbach. New York: Ox-
ford University Press. 1983. Pp. xv, 182. Cloth, $16.95; paper, 
$6.95. 
We live in a strange time. High priests of our legal order are 
questioning the law. At ritual events and in official publications the 
legal elite has stopped celebrating the law and encouraging its use, 
and has begun to chastise the public for relying on the law and to 
condemn lawyers who encourage such popular vices. Where chief 
justices, law school deans and similar types once celebrated the Rule 
of Law as the core of American civilization and advocated the ex-
pansion of legal rights and legal services, some now rail against the 
evils of "legal pollution" and warn of the threat of a "litigation 
explosion." 
The picture that is painted is of a people in moral decline. In 
tones reminiscent of revival meetings, these high priests associate 
law with images of evil and its use with weakness and decadence. A 
former law school dean and president of the Legal Services Corpora-
tion calls up the foul image of "legal pollution . . . clogging the 
everyday affairs of all of us."1 The Chief Justice of the United States 
chastises Americans for "increasingly turning to the courts for relief 
from a range of personal distresses and anxieties."2 
The nation, we are told, is threatened by the disease of 
hyperlexis and the litigation explosion it engenders. In a recent arti-
cle, Mark Cannon, assistant to our Chief Justice, tells us that because 
Americans react to virtually any problem by bringing a lawsuit, we 
are in the grip of an unprecedented litigation explosion that is strain-
ing our courts, eroding self-government, weakening representative 
t Copyright © 1984, David M. Trubek. 
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institutions, and sapping the economy.3 Litigation is evidence of the 
decline of virtue: "[T]he epidemic of litigation," Cannon thunders, 
"reflects weakness in American society."4 Noting that litigation 
rates are much lower in Japan than in the United States, he suggests 
that our greater litigiousness may explain why Japan's per capita in-
come has caught up with ours in the last twenty-five years.5 "The 
legal explosion," he says, "saps the strength of our economy."6 If we 
weren't spending all that time suing, Cannon hints, we would have 
designed better cars and television sets. 
Those who preach against the evils of litigation and the tempta-
tions of too much law have a cure in mind. We have sinned, but 
redemption is at hand. Surely, in the heavenly city there will be less 
conflict: the priests suggest that all will be better when the populace 
is more self-reliant, lawyers less greedy, and judges more restrained. 
But they do not want to ban all conflict; they also want to channel 
conflict out of the courts and into "informal" institutions. Through 
the greater use of arbitration, conciliation, mediation, and neighbor-
hood justice centers we will find what is needed to restore lost repub-
lican virtues and even revive flagging industries.7 
These people are not simply telling us to shape up and stop using 
the law so much; some are suggesting we employ institutions that 
might be seen as the antithesis of law. Dispute processing institu-
tions are informal, Richard Abel tells us, 
to the extent that they are nonbureaucratic in structure and relatively 
undifferentiated from the larger society, minimize the use of profes-
sionals, and eschew official law in favor of substantive and procedural 
norms that are vague, unwritten, commonsensical, flexible, ad hoc, and 
particularistic. [Vol.1, p. 2]. 
So described, informal justice seems to be the negation of the idea of 
the rule oflaw. Roberto Unger has identified four attributes that are 
essential to what he calls a "legal order": for the rule of law to exist 
law must emanate from the state, be explicit, be applied by in-
dependent and autonomous decisionmakers, and apply generally to 
all persons similarly situated. 8 Are the current apostles of informal 
justice advocating the abandonment of law in this sense? Are people 
who spend their lives litigating or adjudicating ( or teaching others to 
do so) losing faith in the law and urging people to seek other solu-
tions? Just as the people are (supposedly) flocking to the courts in 
3. Cannon, Contentious and Burdensome Litigation: A Need far Alternatives, 63 NATL. Fo-
RUM, Fall 1983, at 10. 
4. Id at 12. 
5. Id at 11. 
6. Id 
7. Burger, supra note 2, at 276-77; Cannon, supra note 3, at 12. 
8. R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 47-127 (1976). 
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droves, they are told: do not enter these dark and dismal halls; take 
your cares elsewhere. 
·This seems like a paradox. Shouldn't lawyers be proud of the 
formal processes that underlie our concept of the rule of law and 
thus the liberal vision of politics and society? Inf ormalism could be 
seen as a threat to the idea of law itself. If law cannot be separated 
from community norms or immediate purposes and thus stand be-
yond politics, if norms are not applied by any specialized deci-
sionmakers enjoying some measure of autonomy, how can rights be 
preserved? If there are no ways to restrict bias in judgments by in-
sisting on detachment, and limiting what may be heard at trial, if no 
standards exist by which judgments can be reviewed and discretion 
curbed, what then remains of the liberal concept of law? Yet if in-
formalism is so much at odds with our common notions of legal or-
der, why are some who claim to speak for the legal profession and 
the judiciary so eager to tum away from formal justice and so ready 
to adopt dispute processing techniques that rely little, if at all, on the 
application of pre-existing rules, use lay rather than professional 
decisionmakers, seek accommodation rather than the definition and 
enforcement of rights, and arguably provide less protection against 
bias and discretion? 
One way to resolve this apparent paradox is to view the interest 
in inf ormalism not as a preference for this approach, but as the re-
luctant acceptance of a second-best solution. Imagine that these law-
yers, wedded to the formal system, but concerned about an 
impending litigation catastrophe, decided that triage was essential 
and that the less desirable but cheaper solution of inf ormalism had 
to be adopted -in the crisis. This account would resolve the paradox 
but it is not an accurate picture of what happened. The preference 
for inf ormalism and the push for "alternatives" to litigaton did not 
emerge after careful study of existing litigation practices or the 
thoughtful weighing of any evidence of a catastrophe. The diagnosis 
and the cure emerged at the same time. Indeed, one could argue that 
the purported litigation crisis was invented to justify the solution of 
informalism, rather than the other way around. 
The case that things are so bad that we must settle for second-
rate justice has never really been proven. Marc Galanter has con-
ducted a meticulous analysis of the literature that predicts disaster if 
litigation trends continue, a field he calls "hyperlexology."9 He 
shows that the claims made in this literature rest on scant evidence. 
Frequently-made statements about the propensity of Americans to 
litigate and allegations that we are the world's most litigious society 
9. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of .Disputes: What We Know and .Don't Know (And 
Think We Kow) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 7 
(1983). 
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were based on scant data. 1° Claims that litigation rates are soaring 
and have reached unprecedented levels rely on selected statistics and 
projections of short-run trends. 11 Further, one can dispute such 
claims by taking account of more of the available evidence. For ex-
ample, my colleagues in the Civil Litigation Research Project and I 
have shown that only a small percent of the disputes Americans en-
gage in become lawsuits, that most of our lawsuits are settled, and 
that most cases are modest in scope.12 Galanter's data suggest that 
our litigation rates are neither higher than those in other industrial 
countries nor higher than they have been at other times in our past. 13 
Little evidence has yet been offered to support the view that, like 
it or not, we must tum away from law to stem the flood of lawsuits. 
But that is not really the point. For the advocates of informalism do 
not just offer "alternative" dispute processing institutions as a sec-
ond-best solution. Quite the contrary: the literature is replete with 
statements that informal justice is preferable. Such processes are 
pictured as fairer and more accessible, as well as quicker and 
cheaper than the courts.14 The advocates of inf ormalism do not 
think they are promoting an inferior brand of justice. 
So the paradox remains. The elite lawyers' interest in informal, 
non-legal dispute processing is not a thoughtful, tragic response dic-
tated by a well-understood and irrefutable catastrophe. The tum to 
alternatives, at least in the ritual rhetoric of many elite spokesmen, 
must be something more - or less - than that. To understand this 
tum of events we must look beneath the surface. That is what the 
two books under review help us to do. Both Jerome Auerbach, a 
historian and critic of the legal profession, and Richard Abel, a law-
yer and sociologist of law, take the current passion for informal dis-
pute processing as a puzzle to be unraveled, and seek to place the 
discussion in historical, comparative, and theoretical contexts. 
These books help us to understand current paradoxes in elite 
rhetoric because they relate ideas about the administration of justice 
to broader visions of society and the political movements they reflect 
or engender. Both authors are concerned with the roots of informal-
ism. They recognize that ideas about resolving disputes involve 
more than technical questions of judicial management. Both want 
not only to describe the emergence of the views that mediation is 
preferable to adjudication, that community norms are better than of-
10. Id at 10-11. 
11. Id at 37. 
12. Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 
UCLA L. REv. 72 (1983) (summarizing the findings of a national survey which explored the 
use and non-use of courts, the costs of civil litigation, and related matters). 
13. Galanter, supra note 9, at 36-60. 
14. E.g., Burger, supra note 2, at 277; Cannon, supra note 3, at 13. 
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ficial law, or that face-to-face interaction is superior to the cold and 
distant routine of the courts: they also seek to explain why such 
views are expressed and sometimes take hold. 
Although they share an interest in the roots of inf ormalism, these 
authors approach the question in different ways and evaluate phe-
nomena differently. Auerbach is deeply attracted to informal justice 
because it is the expression of a communitarian vision of society he 
favors and a rejection of a competitive individualism he decries. 
Deeply skeptical of American liberalism and the legalism that it en-
genders, Auerbach seeks to show that throughout our history there 
have been groups whose alternative vision of society led them to seek 
'justice without law'': to define norms and settle conflict through 
community interaction and face-to-face mediation rather than by 
adversarial conflict and detached adjudication. He sees the legal 
profession as the principal obstacle to successful realization of this 
ideal of justice without law. 
Abel shares Auerbach's distrust of lawyers and some of his en-
thusiasm for true community and informal processes of dispute reso-
lution. Abel, however, sees the primary obstacle . to genuine 
informalism not in the professional interests of the bar, but in the 
needs of a capitalist economy and the operation of the capitalist 
state. Moreover, Abel's focus is extremely broad. While Auerbach is 
content to survey debates about modes of dispute processing 
throughout American history, Abel goes even further in his search 
for the roots of informalism. Assembling essays by numerous au-
thors in two large volumes, Abel offers us a survey that covers many 
cultures and ~es. The two volumes of The Politics of Informal Jus-
tice include general theoretical essays and specific empirical and his-
torical studies. The quality is mixed, but they form an impressive 
whole. Abel includes studies that confirm Auerbach's claim that dis-
senting movements in America like the Knights of Labor have found 
the idea of informal justice attractive. But The Politics of Informal 
Justice also examines the importance of informal justice in the polit-
ical programs of movements and regimes as disparate as the Nazis in 
Germany, traditional modernizers in pre-World War II Japan, and 
socialists in Allende's Chile, Communist China, contemporary Por-
tugal and post-colonial Mozambique. These volumes show that the 
rhetoric of informal justice has been used by modernizing elites 
seeking to preserve some of the hierarchical structure of traditional 
society during industrialization, and by radical socialists whose ap-
parent goal is a decentralized and egalitarian society. 
The authors in these books are not promoting the use of alterna-
tive dispute processing in the United States today. Auerbach doesn't 
think that experiments in arbitration, mediation, and neighborhood 
justice currently supported by our legal elite will do much good; 
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Abel and some of his colleagues think they could do great harm. 
Neither book tells us in detail how alternative techniques work or 
how alternative institutions actually function. One would not con-
sult these books to learn how to be a mediator or set up a neighbor-
hood justice center. Indeed, they contain relatively little information 
on actual projects and procedures. The focus is not on how to do it 
or on who is doing it, but on why everyone seems to be talking about 
it and what that means. 
These books raise important questions about the role of images 
and institutions of justice in American life. Auerbach sees a perma-
nent tension between formal and informal conceptions of justice and 
explores oscillations between them throughout our history. Abel 
asks whether the move to informalism presages a major turning 
point in the American legal system: even his comparative studies 
seem to be designed to shed light on that question. 15 Both see that 
the move towards mediation, arbitration, and the neighborhood jus-
tice centers is a move away from courts and the ideal of formal jus-
tice. They are as interested in explaining why we might be moving 
away from our core legal institutions as in knowing what we are 
moving towards. They seek to give an account of the apparent turn-
ing away from law as a central source of justice in America. 
To do that, one must have a theory about relationships between 
cultural ideals, political movements, and legal institutions. These 
volumes suggest not one theory but several. The authors Abel has 
assembled do not share a common perspective. Several participated 
in a Conference on Critical Legal Studies panel which gave birth to 
this book, and most share a general left-wing orientation, but their 
work is otherwise quite diverse. Auerbach shares Abel's skepticism 
about some of the current rage for alternatives but not his analytic 
framework, which draws heavily on the Marxist tradition. Read to-
gether, these volumes do not offer a single explanation for the para-
dox I have alluded to - or any other questions that arise when we 
consider the contradictory nature of the discourse on informalism in 
America today. Rather, the books provide a series of theoretical 
starting points, interpretative approaches, and concrete hypotheses. 
Since the perspectives set forth are rich and the historical and socio-
logical analyses quite provocative, these books will be of use to 
scholars of law in society long after the ill-starred and misnamed 
"neighborhood justice center" (which wasn't in a neighborhood and 
dispensed relatively little justice) is thankfully forgotten. 
If we look for a way to explain the turning away from law I have 
15. Abel sets forth his goals in the Introduction to Volume 1. He asks if recent "tirades 
against the expansion of . . . rights, . . . professional legal services, and . . . formal legal 
institutions" presage a major transformation of our legal system, or are just a lot of talk. The 
goal of the two volumes is to explore that question. Vol 1, pp. 1-2. 
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described, if we think of these books as aids in the interpretation of a 
discourse in which some elite spokesmen for the American legal pro-
fession decry the overuse of law and call for non-legal solutions to 
conflicts and problems, what do we find? Naturally, in a collection 
this heterogeneous there are numerous competing and even conflict-
ing explanations. However, at the end of Volume 1 of The Politics of 
Informal Justice Abel includes an excellent essay of his own on "The 
Contradictions of Informal Justice" (vol. 1, pp. 267-320) which 
serves as a summary of the major themes explored. This, read along 
with Auerbach's thesis, helps us identify several core ideas. While 
these are tentative and overlapping, there are five accounts of the 
"turning away from law" that strike me as especially fruitful. They 
suggest it could be: 
(i) a tactic designed to accomplish a concrete set of political goals; 
(ii) a defensive move by the legal profession to co-opt and control 
popular movements which threaten the profession's economic 
interests; 
(iii) a response to the need to legitimate the legal system by offering 
new ideals that hold out new promises of fairness after others 
have been exposed as shams; 
(iv) an effort to create an atmosphere in which the role of law in 
America could be altered; and 
(v) a way to introduce a new form of social control that is more perva-
sive and powerful than formal law. 
If we wish to probe the motives behind the move toward in-
formalism, the tactical explanation is the most obvious. There are 
concrete situations in which people may think that handling certain 
kinds of disputes in informal settings will lead to different results 
than would be had in the courts. In these situations the rhetoric 
about the general virtues of informalism may simply mask an effort 
to favor X over Y. The Abel volumes include several examples of 
this rather focused, tactical use of informalism. One of the most in-
teresting is Mark Lazerson's account of the introduction of an infor-
mal Housing Court to handle landlord-tenant cases in the Bronx 
(vol. 1, pp. 119-63). Lazerson shows that this effort was, at least in 
part, motivated by desires to weaken tenant groups who, with aid 
from legal services lawyers, had successfully used the regular courts 
and formal law to secure a better bargaining position vis-a-vis 
slumlords. Another is John Haley's intriguing story of the decision 
by the Japanese during the inter-war period to introduce mandatory 
conciliation in landlord-tenant, family and similar disputes (vol. 2, 
pp. 125-47). Haley shows that the Japanese elite pushed for concilia-
tion as an alternative to litigation because of rather concrete political 
goals: they feared the impact of litigation under the new civil code 
on the traditional structure of Japanese life and wanted to ensure 
that the political inroads on family and local authority which litiga-
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tion could engender would be curbed. In both cases a rhetoric that 
stressed the general virtues of informal over formal dispute settle-
ment actually justified changes designed to benefit a specific group. 
A second explanation for the newfound interest in inf ormalism is 
that lawyers may be trying to control a movement that threatens 
their professional interests. Auerbach tells us that at an earlier stage 
in our history lawyers felt threatened by business and popular dissat-
isfaction with the legal system, a dissatisfaction that included pres-
sure to set up dispute processing systems that did not use lawyers at 
all. One among many fascinating stories he tells is that of the "legal-
ization" of commercial arbitration, in which the legal profession 
managed to take control of and shape a movement for commercial 
arbitration that had started as an effort to create truly informal, non-
legal dispute processing institutions and ended up constructing a 
parallel system of relatively formal justice dominated by lawyers and 
employing many elements of the adversarial process and the judicial 
method (pp. 96-97, 101). Certainly to some degree similar concerns 
animate current calls for inf ormalism emanating from the legal elite. 
Aren't law schools taking an interest in divorce mediation, for exam-
ple, because they fear students will not be equipped to compete with 
non-legal professionals trained in non-adversarial techniques? Such 
concerns play some role in the current scene, but it is interesting that 
none of these authors identify any strong or broad-based pressures 
for informal justice that might be forcing lawyers to try to preempt 
the rhetoric and practice of alternatives. Indeed, Auerbach calls the 
most recent period ''The Legalization of Community" (p. 115), sug-
gesting that the images of "community'' associated with informal 
justice are being used primarily by lawyers who have taken the lead 
in the current movement. The only "grass-roots" pressures he finds 
in recent years are the efforts of some reformers to use informal dis-
pute processing as part of a "community empowerment" strategy 
(pp. 116-17). But these efforts, which after all were initiated by elite 
lawyers like Jean and Edgar Cahn, came to very little. As Paul 
W ahrhaftig points out in his contribution to the Abel book (vol. 1, 
pp. 75-97), few of the recent American alternative dispute processing 
experiments were really organized around viable communities, fewer 
were oriented to community empowerment, and most that were did 
not succeed. Although efforts at co-option and preemption may play 
a role in the story, they seem less important than other factors. 
The authors suggest that the discourse on inf ormalism may serve 
ideological functions as well as protect concrete interests. Because 
they show how images of dispute processing play a role in diverse 
political ideologies, these books draw our attention to the ideological 
dimension of discourse on the administration of justice. Is there an 
ideological function behind the new interest in informal and non-
adversarial modes of dispute processing? Abel and Auerbach think 
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so. Both suggest that the turning point away from law may be a 
response to legitimation needs. Inf ormalism may distract attention 
away from the flaws of the legal system while reducing potential 
threats to social stability that could result from our taking law too 
seriously. 
• Legitimation is a central theme of Auerbach's book and a major 
topic of the analysis offered by several authors in the Abel collec-
tion.16 The central argument (when applied to the United States) is 
that in practice American law must always disappoint those to whom 
it offers a promise of freedom, equality, and justice. For Auerbach, 
the struggle to legitimate American society through law is "Sisyphi-
an" (p. 146), for an ideology that relies on legalism seeks to reconcile 
the irreconcilable. While law promises freedom, equality, and neu-
trality, our legal system is embedded in a society that denies effective 
liberty to many, encourages inequality, and subverts any genuine ef-
fort to construct a system of control outside the structures of power 
and hierarchy that we all live in. In this analysis, since the promise 
of American law must always exceed its performance, the legal elite 
is constantly struggling to find ways to cover over flaws or generate 
new utopias to preserve the illusion that these flaws will be resolved 
in short order.17 Informalism, in this sense, is just the latest answer to 
the perennial problem of justifying a system that denies its own 
ideals. Proposals for inf ormalism make it easier for the elite to fore-
stall the widespread criticism that American law is inaccessible, that 
high costs ration law and favor haves over have-nots, and that the 
law offers no solution to many of the most immediate problems of 
daily life. By promising the institution of some new solution to these 
age-old problems, in the form of arbitration, mediation, neighbor-
hood justice centers, and the like, lawyers can preserve the legiti-
macy of the legal system, itself a central part of our national creed. 
This analysis could explain why we have turned to informalism 
as a new solution and at the same time done so little to implement it. 
For it is important to recognize that despite all the talk about alter-
natives, very little has been done to create any. The Dispute Resolu-
tion Act, which was supposed to put federal money behind the 
movement for alternatives, was never funded. 18 The neighborhood 
justice center program has been abandoned by the federal govern-
16. See e.g., Abel (vol. l, pp. 267-320), Santos (vol. l, pp. 249-66), and Reifner (vol. 2, pp. 
81-123). 
17. For further discussion of these aspects of American legal ideology, see Trubek, Com• 
plexity and Contradiction in the Legal Order: Ba/bus and the Challenge of Critical Social 
Thought About Law, l l LAW & Socv. REV. 529-69 (1977); Trubek, Where the Action Is: Criti-
cal Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REv. - (1983) (forthcoming). 
18. The Dispute Resolution Act of Feb. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-190, § 2 (b), 94 Stat. 17 
(1981), was passed ''to assist the States and other interested parties in providing to all persons 
convenient access to dispute resolution mechanisms which are effective, fair, inexpensive and 
expeditious." Auerbach notes that while Congress approved the bill, and it was signed into 
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ment. Foundation interest has waned. As the rhetoric of informal-
ism grows in intensity, less is done to tum the rhetoric into reality. 
The nature of the rhetoric, however, provides an additional clue 
that may help us solve our original puzzle. Even if we accept the 
legitimacy theory which I have distilled from Auerbach and Abel, 
we are led to ask: why this form of legitimation? Even if we accept 
the view that American legal thought must contain a utopian ele-
ment that resolves the contradiction between the law's promise of 
escape from inequality and domination and the reality that the law is 
just part of an unjust and hierarchical system, we are still led to ask 
why informalism has become our new utopia. For if there has been 
any real change in the last ten years, it is not in the organization and 
structure of the legal system but in the utopian images that the legal 
elite employs. Ten years ago our elites had an answer to the "unful-
filled promise of American law," but it was the answer of more law, 
not less. Ten years ago those who participated in the high rituals of 
the legal order - honorary lectures, commencement addresses, and 
the like - often used these events as opportunities to call for the 
extension of rights, expansion oflegal services, creation of public in-
terest law, and improved "access to justice." Why is it that today 
these images are thrown aside and we are told of the delights of in-
formalism, the wonders of the indwelling community, the promise of 
mediation? 
These volumes offer several possible answers to this question, all 
of them chilling. One is that our elites have recognized that the 
promise of more law is too dangerous: when we promised to over-
come dissatisfaction with the legal system by improving representa-
tion for the have-nots and strengthening their rights, these promises 
actually made a difference. Cases were brought and rights never 
before taken seriously had to be respected. These changes challenged 
powerful groups who look to the law to protect their interests, not to 
limit their power. If the vice of perfected legalism as a utopia is that 
it might be taken seriously, then the solution is to offer a new utopia, 
an alternative vision of society and conflict resolution that down-
grades the idea of rights, undercuts the rationale for extending legal 
services to the poor and unorganized groups, yet at the same time 
strengthens traditional bonds and authorities and discourages the 
sort of conflict that might lead to substantive justice. Is that what 
underlies the current passion for informal justice? 
A second suggestion is equally disturbing. The idea that in-
formalism is a way in which the state expands its power, while cloak-
ing it in the garb of "community," forms a leitmot!f in the Abel 
volumes. Abel and several others suggest that while inf ormalism ap-
law by President Carter, no funds have been appropriated under it and the Act remains a dead 
letter. Pp. 136-37. 
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pears to be a way to return power to neighborhoods, communities 
and private organizations, it really serves to facilitate expanded state 
intervention in our lives. 
In his essay on "The Contradictions of Informal Justice" (vol. 1, 
pp. 267-320), Abel speculates on what might come about if the move 
toward informal justice were successful. Today, he suggests, we 
have a situation in which social control is exerted partly by private 
structures with some relationship to genuine communities, and 
partly by state institutions which are circumscribed by formal law. 
The growth of informal justice, he argues, threatens both to weaken 
genuine forms of community and to undermine the protections 
granted by the form.al system. 
While the apostles of inf ormalism routinely invoke the rhetoric 
of a "natural" community (which is contrasted with the artifice of 
law), and suggest that alternative forms of dispute processing are a 
way to return justice to the community, Abel's study shows that the 
projects which implement this idea actually depend on state re-
sources and state personnel. Neighborhood justice centers, for ex-
ample, were primarily funded by government grants and associated 
with courts, not neighborhoods. As Christine Harrington points out 
(vol. I, pp. 35-71), most centers depend on referrals from courts and 
prosecutors for their case load. So, Abel suggests, the proponents of 
informalism don't actually want to strengthen real communities: 
rather they will substitute new forms of state control which lack both 
the spontaneity of civil society and the minimal protections of formal 
law. Since alternative institutions are supported, directly or indi-
rectly, by the state they will supersede any "genuine" community 
structures that do exist. Since alternative institutions are pictured as 
non-coercive (despite the fact that they often need coercion to work) 
they can dispense with the sort of due process protections which are 
built into our formal system. 
The critics tell us not to believe in the chimera of justice without 
law. But they also tell us they do not believe in justice through law. 
We seem to be left with no way out. Auerbach and Abel denounce 
legal formalism almost as vigorously as they condemn inf ormalism. 
Auerbach's book contains a strong polemic against liberal legalism 
and the legal profession, as well as a passionate condemnation of the 
sort of society and culture which makes formal law seem either nec-
essary or desirable. But he recognizes that we live in just such a 
society. Since he believes that any alternative vision of justice will 
be a delusion unless the society itself is changed - a possibility that 
he seems to discount -Auerbach counsels us to reject the tum away 
from law. The book ends on a note of stoic resignation: legal for-
malism, however hollow and terrifying, is still all we have to cling to. 
The values of informal justice and the vision of community they em-
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body, he suggests, are the ones we should espouse, but anyone who 
thinks they can be realized in America today is a chump, and anyone 
who proposes trying to do so must be trying to fool us. 
In a sense, Abel's volumes strike the same stoic note. It is true 
that Abel himself clearly relates both the flaws of formalism and the 
pitfalls of informalism to the operation of the capitalist system, thus 
implying that transformation of the system may be a way out. More-
over, some of his collaborators emphatically embrace socialism and 
point to socialist experiments in inf ormalism as exemplars. Thus 
Abel, more than Auerbach, points us toward a transformative poli-
tics. But the nature of this struggle is unclear. While Abel and his 
colleagues survey a wide range of experiences and demonstrate some 
enthusiasm for popular justice in other times and other places, one 
gets the feeling that the closer they get to our reality, the more 
trouble they have deriving political lessons or an affirmative vision 
from their analysis. As a result, they can only condemn the dangers 
of false informalism and are, like Auerbach, forced to hold onto le-
gal formalism, however diminished and hollow it may be. 
So the ultimate paradox in this story is that no one really seems 
to believe in law anymore. The elites who champion alternatives 
question the law's efficacy, but so do the critics. Auerbach sees legal-
ism as the antithesis of community and humane values; Abel and his 
colleagues see formal law as at best a weak reed that the poor can 
occasionally hold onto and at worst the very heart of oppression. 
The high priests celebrate an inf ormalism they don't believe in, 
while the critics reluctantly champion a formalism they distrust. 
